Mubarak: A Sad End to a Distinguished Career

Throughout the upheaval in Egypt, the world held its breath in anticipation of a repeat of a Tiananmen-type crackdown in Cairo, a reference to the June 4, 1989 massacre in Beijing when soldiers of China’s Popular Liberation Army (PLA) systematically open fired on Chinese students protesting against tyranny and for Democracy in that city’s largest square. Fortunately, this particular incident, which embodied authoritarianism at its worst, did not materialize in Egypt even though Hosni Mubarak, a former Air Force general, commanded the loyalty of that country’s Armed Forces. Judging Mubarak’s desperate attempt to cling to power, it is obvious that he could have resorted to a similar tactic or worse, except that two factors prevented the aging authoritarian from going down that path. Nevertheless, hundreds of Egyptians were killed during the uprising and with reports of the fallen president and his family having stolen billions from their countrymen, the Hosni Mubarak story may be far from over.
Because Egypt’s generals prefer US’ M-1 Abrams tanks and F-16s to Russia’s T-90 and Sukhoi Su-30s, they were loath to jeopardize the modernization of that country’s armed forces, even if that entailed abandoning one of their own. Therefore, Washington’s unequivocal warning to Mubarak that the use of U.S weaponry by the military against the protesters was unacceptable had left the beleaguered tyrant with no other option but to comply. Moreover, like the Filipinos in 1986 and the Russians in 1991, the Egyptians have learned to bestow on their country’s Armed Forces the title of savior of the nation and woo them to their side. This approach had the effect of mellowing the reactionaries among the Officer Corps and enlisting the support of the rank and file. Needless to say, even passionate crowds have become adept at utilizing diplomacy to further their goals. In the end, Egypt’s Armed Forces came through and forced Mubarak out, although the fundamentals that allowed him to stay in power for close to 30 years will survive his ouster.
Political decisions by nature always take a life of their own, regardless of efforts by their initiators to steer them in a particular direction. Delusional to the end, Mubarak sincerely or rather arrogantly believed that he was the last rampart against chaos, which explains his unsuccessful effort at presiding over the transition to a democratic and transparent system as demanded by the U.S and other Western powers. Paradoxically, Mubarak’s stubbornness may have been more detrimental to Egypt’s entrenched military establishment than Washington, which was worried about a possible radicalization of the protests that would have benefited the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Ultimately, the army will lose the privileged position it held in the country since 1952, when a group of nationalist army officers overthrew King Farouk I. In retrospect, had Mubarak given up earlier, his resignation could have led to a civilian administration totally beholden to the protesters and their demands, which would certainly have included the abrogation of the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel. His obstinate nature effectively thwarted a true revolution in Egypt, since his removal from power became the focus of the revolt and took the sail out the protesters’ goal of bringing the dismantlement of the repressive state he presided over for almost 30 years.
With a Supreme Military Council officially in charge of the country, Egyptians will have to defer to the military’s propensity for law and order and settle for incremental political and economic reforms that may never satisfy their desire to live in a democratic and prosperous state. Despite its huge population (85 million) relative to other countries in the region, Egypt is no longer the politically predominant Arab state that it was under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-70) and Anwar Al-Sadat (1970-81). The real threat to that country’s future and the region is a demagogue politician attempting to stake a claim to that past glory, currently an unlikely possibility, rather than the Muslim fundamentalists who don’t stand a chance of taking power in the near future. In 1979 Iran, the protesters considered the Shah (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) a US puppet and wanted to recover their country’s sovereignty which, naturally, paved the way for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a fervent nationalist and anti-Western cleric to take over. Egypt, on the other hand, is a confident nation, conscious of its responsibilities and limits in an evolving geopolitical environment. The fact that the demonstrators never equated Mubarak’s close ties to the U.S and Israel as the source of their torments is an indication that the Egyptians favor the present course minus the systemic repression and corruption.
Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), unlike the charismatic Nasser and courageous Sadat, was a caretaker for the military establishment that rules Egypt since 1952. He was a man who served his country for six decades as a soldier and politician. For that reason, he should be allowed to enjoy a dignified retirement in the land he so faithfully served and spare the ignominy of an exile. Though the military was right in orchestrating his departure, the generals must see to it that the man retains his dignity and serves Egypt as an elder statesman. Vilified and hated by the angry protestors, Mubarak will nonetheless be remembered fondly by many Egyptians, and his having been on the world stage for close to 30 years is an asset to the next generation of Egyptian leaders and Egypt that should not be thrown away.

Democracy in Haiti: A House of Cards

Left to themselves, politicians invariably choose the path of self-interest, which naturally differs from the aspirations and needs of their people, especially in countries, such as Haiti, where a system of checks and balances is non-existent. The late French president, Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970), could not have said it better “Politics are too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.” The drama that followed the November 28th general elections in Haiti proved the point. The decision by René Préval to invite an OAS (Organization of the American States) technical team to sort out the irregularities went beyond his constitutional prerogatives, yet no one saw the rationale behind his move. What followed was a political decision by the OAS technical team that will haunt the country for the next two years. Whoever wins the March 20th vote will be at the mercy of Préval’s INITE party which could have absolute control of both chambers in the next Parliament.
The naked interference and belligerent statements of the international community notwithstanding, the OAS team’s decision left the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), the entity that perpetuated the fraud in the first place, in charge of organizing the run-off. Seeing that fraud was rampant in all the races where government candidates have either won or secured a place in the run-off, the decision, which omitted these races from scrutiny, basically handed over control of the next Parliament to Préval’s political party (INITE). Therefore, the winner is none other than René G. Préval, the man whose overt attempt to subvert the will of the electorate backfired on December 2nd 2010 when supporters of the then-eliminated candidate, Michel Martelly, rioted and demanded the annulment of these elections.
Despite the grandstanding and posturing of members of the CEP trumpeting the nominally independent institution’s adherence to constitutional legalities, they knew that the team-OAS’ decision to override the December 2nd results, which had guaranteed Jude Celestin, the government-backed candidate, a place in the March 20th run-off, could not be countermanded. Accordingly, the drama that unfolded last Wednesday, during which most Haitians were led to believe that a sound legal decision was forthcoming, was for public consumption and nothing else. The team-OAS decision, which came with threats and other public statements that underlined Haiti’s position as an occupied country, also revealed that political expediency trumps the need to fostering the rule of law in that country. Not surprisingly, no one, among the fraudsters of the CEP, will be prosecuted for having violated the public trust and traumatized an entire nation trying to recover from last year’s calamities (earthquake, hurricanes and a cholera epidemic.)
Most importantly, the ensuing delay in electing a president allows René Préval whose term expired on February 7th to carry on as president until his successor is chosen. It is to be expected that the run-off scheduled for March 20th will bring its own set of legal challenges from the defeated candidate, thus extending Préval’s presidency into the May 14th deadline sanctioned by the international community as a concession to his party accepting the elimination of Jude Celestin. For a man suffering from an intrinsic fear of being persecuted once he leaves office, creating distractions for the next president is too good an opportunity to pass on.
The deal that forced the CEP to invalidate its own decision may be the tip of the iceberg. The more time Préval has, the more likely he will sign or accept deals that are detrimental to the interests of the Haitian people. Manigat and Martelly, in all probability, remember Gerard Latortue’s surreptitious trip to New York during which the illegitimate prime minister (2004-06) signed over jurisdictional control of Haiti’s National Police to the MINUSTAH, the week after the country elected a president on February 7th 2006. In that regard, both candidates should pledge to review any decision made by Préval beyond the constitutional deadline of February 7th. Even insignificant matters such as Préval ordering toilet paper for his staff must not escape the scrutiny of the next government, given that the man’s paramount concern remains his own interests.
Currently the future of Haiti hinges on twisted politics and the precept of Manifest Destiny, which apparently run contrary to the aspirations of its people. The extent that the Haitian people have allowed their destiny to be hijacked by unscrupulous politicians and the international community validates the notion that they are complicit in their ordeal. Therefore, any fundamental changes in the way the country is administered will not be forthcoming until the Haitian people decide otherwise and take full control of their destiny. For the international community, elections in Haiti are a means to an end. They help legitimize the inhumane conditions existing in Haiti under the cover of a peculiar brand of Democracy, which, of course, is neither inclusive nor fair. The policy works, insofar, as forestalling an upheaval by the masses, however, the global rise in food prices (Haiti imports 80% of its food needs), is a potent factor that could bring down this house of cards.
For 30 years, Egypt lived under a state of emergency and the Egyptians never protested. Economic hardships and rising food prices however provided the catalyst for the current upheaval in that country. Equally, the architects of Economic Liberalism will soon have to deal with its consequences in Haiti which, like Mubarak’s Egypt, suffers from the negative aspects of the system. The house of cards will certainly not survive the onslaught.

Egypt in Ebullition

While the right of people everywhere to determine their destiny is fundamental, as US president Barack Obama readily acknowledges, this precept is systematically ignored by many political leaders or suppressed whenever it runs contrary to the interests of entrenched elites or strategic goals of powerful nations. Though the deficiency of suppressing that right is periodically tested by popular revolts, these leaders continue to stay the course. This has the effect of fueling a cycle of violence that tear up the social fabric of the affected nation. Most importantly, on the day of reckoning, the specter of instability is invariably used as a rationale by these leaders to deflect or block out the people’s anger. What is happening in Egypt is a case in point.
Indeed a radical political change in Egypt, similar to what happened in Iran (circa 1979), would be disastrous to US national security interests in the region. Lebanon is on shaky ground; Jordan could be next and the mother of them all, Saudi Arabia, will then become the focus of anti-US and western sentiments in the Arab world. For that reason, Washington must forcefully and unequivocally demand that Hosni Mubarak step down because historically street revolutions’ objectives changed from one hour to the next. Any prolongation of Mubarak’s rule in the face of such spontaneous and widespread revolt may be regarded by the protesters as having Washington’s explicit blessing. As a result, grassroots support for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, the country’s largest and best organized political party, could swell to the point where it threatens the secular outlook of the Egyptian state.
After 30 years in power, Mubarak is clearly disconnected from the reality. Having received 85% of the vote in the 2006 presidential election, which was neither free nor fair, the 82 year-old president may have thought that he was in fact indispensable and enjoyed the support of the Egyptian people. This is a man who, as vice-president, became president following the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadat in 1981, yet chose not to have a stand-in successor for the last 10 years. Like many dictators before him, Mubarak must have felt that he was infallible and immortal. Most importantly, for a man trying to quell a revolt that started over human rights abuses by his security forces, his appointment of Omar Suleiman, a former intelligence chief, as vice-president, was somewhat bizarre. It implied that continuity meant more to Hosni Mubarak than the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people, which he cavalierly ignored throughout his rule.
Because the world media is taken with the notion of a social network revolution in Egypt powered by Twitter and Facebook, it fails to connect the upheaval to the downside effects of globalization. Egypt’s economy has had robust growth for many years, yet more Egyptians are having trouble making ends meet, a clear indication of a vacuum between the positive side of economic liberalism and the reality facing the majority of the population. Any jump in prices or shortages of basic foods will produce many of these popular revolts throughout the developing world, but the architects of globalization see no need for corrective measures.
Though the initial protests were about the crushing poverty affecting 40% of the population, high unemployment, endemic corruption and the systemic repression that epitomize the Mubarak regime (1981-?), the objectives of the protesters can easily evolve from wanting to fix these irregularities to doing away with the system altogether. In that regard, Washington should heed the wisdom of the late French president, Charles de Gaulle, who famously stated “The cemeteries of the world are full of indispensable men.” Abandoning a trusted friend and ally, who was too obstinate for his own good, may be morally reprehensible but hold long-term benefits for the US, since its national security
At the 2011 Davos World Economic Forum, Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, admitted that a process of change is happening in Egypt but pointed out the need to manage it because obscure forces might try to take advantage of the situation. Indeed the process of change in Egypt can only be managed as long as the initiative comes from the government. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Therefore, the longer the crisis persists, the more difficult it will be for the Egyptian establishment and the West to influence the outcome and prevent a takeover of the country’s future by radical forces. Ironically Mubarak is a victim of his own success, a fact that could prove problematic to solving the crisis, because he cannot negotiate with an unruly mob of angry citizens. Had he tolerated a middle-of-the-road political opposition, today he would have a legitimate partner to negotiate a smooth transition and avert chaos in the most politically significant Arab country. Fortunately for the US, Egypt is presently not in danger of falling prey to Al-Qeada or other radical Islamists because its powerful army, as in Pakistan and Turkey, acts the guardian of the secular order.
Repression is not the nucleus of stability, as history is littered with the carcasses of regimes that behaved otherwise but were swept away by the universal appeal of human rights. Hence, the Mubarak-types of this world must heed this judgment of history and abandon their propensity to use repression as an antidote to the legitimate aspirations of their people, if the cycle of violence and destruction were to end.